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Abstract It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reason-
ing. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a
reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge
with warranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions
of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately
treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false but good
approximations to the truth for present purposes. Cases based on a variant of Pascal’s
Wager and actions performed by a skeptic also illustrate the point. To the right-to-left
direction: in certain circumstances, it can be unreasonable for a scientist to reason
from propositions of a theory she knows to be true.
Keywords Action · Practical rationality · Knowledge · Belief · Acceptance
1 The epistemic norms of practical reasoning
Intuitively, before the result of a lottery is announced, it seems inappropriate for me to
sell my lottery ticket for a penny on the basis that I will lose, since I do not know that
the ticket is a loser. In the same spirit, I can be criticized for not buying insurance in a
situation in which I do not know that I will not get sick. On the other hand, if I know that
my door is locked, it seems that there is nothing wrong for me not to come back and
check whether it is locked. On the basis of similar intuitions about ordinary appraisals
and criticisms of action, some philosophers have argued that practical reasoning is
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governed by a knowledge norm.1 Consider a specific version of the norm, suggested
by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008):
Reason-Knowledge Principle (RKP)
Where one’s choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p
as a reason for acting iff you know that p (578).2
RKP can be split into the two following conditionals:
NEC: where one’s choice is p-dependent, if it is appropriate to treat p as a reason
for acting, then S knows that p.
SUFF: where one’s choice is p-dependent, if S knows thatp, then it is appropriate
to treat p as a reason for acting.
The claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning has been followed by
a wave of criticism. It has been remarked that data about our ordinary use of “know”
only provides a very fragile basis for concluding that practical reasoning is governed
by such a norm, since sometimes we use “knowing” in a loose sense, meaning “being
certain” or “truly believing” (Gerken 2011, 2015; Littlejohn 2009). It has been argued
that the same alleged data used to motivate the knowledge norm can be explained
assuming other epistemic norms as well (Gerken 2011, 2015; Littlejohn 2009; Neta
2009). Moreover, in some cases the knowledge norm seems to fail to deliver the
right verdict. For example, it seems that the knowledge norm cannot accommodate
intuitions in Gettier-style cases in which the subject is blameless in treating a justified
true belief that p as a reason for acting, even in the absence of knowledge (Brown
2008a, b; Gerken 2011; Littlejohn 2009).
Given these difficulties, some philosophers have opted for other weaker principles
that not only are compatible with the original data motivating the knowledge norm, but
1 For example, Hawthorne claims that “if p is practically relevant, it is acceptable to use the premise that
p in one’s practical reasoning if one knows that p and (at least in many cases) unacceptable to use the
premise that p in one’s practical reasoning if one doesn’t know it” (2004, p. 30). Stanley (2005) holds that
one should act on p only if one knows that p (9). Fantl and McGrath (2007) argue that S knows that p only
if S is rational to act as if p (559).
2 Three remarks about RKP are in order here: First, according to Hawthorne and Stanley, a choice between
options x1. . .xn is p-dependent iff the most preferable of x1. . .xn conditional on the proposition that p is
not the same as the most preferable of x1. . .xn conditional on the proposition that not-p (Ibid., 578). Such a
condition is needed for there are many cases where p is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand, so it seems
odd to say that it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting, even if one knows that p.
Second, the notion of appropriateness in RKP is supposed to be understood as rational permissibility, rather
than in terms of obligation. As Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) point out, “it would be overly demanding to
require someone to treat all of their relevant knowledge as reasons for each action undertaken”. Third, there
are two readings of “treating p as a reason for action” but only one of them is compatible with the intuition
that RKP is supposed to capture. One is to take “treating p as a reason for action” as “using p as a premise
in practical reasoning”. This interpretation is in accordance with the formulation endorsed by Hawthorne
(2004) and is the most intuitive understanding. According to another stronger reading, nothing less than
knowledge can be considered as a reason. This view implies that if p is S’s reason for acting, S knows that
p. However, if treating p as a reason for acting already entails that p is known, S’s reasoning cannot be
assessed normatively according to whether S knows that p. Therefore this notion cannot be the one used in
RKP. Thus, those who may find the notion “treating p as a reason for acting” vague can safely substitute
the notion with “using p as a premise in practical reasoning”. Neta (2009) points out that “treating p as
a reason for acting” differs from “using p as a premise in practical reasoning” in some respects, but the
difference is irrelevant for the discussion here.
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also provide good explanations for the cases in which the knowledge norm delivers the
wrong verdict. For instance, Littlejohn (2009, 2012) and Fantl and McGrath (2002)
argue that the norm of practical reasoning is justified belief,3 Gerken (2011) suggests
that it is belief that p warranted to a degree that is adequate relative to the deliberative
context, and Neta (2009) argues that it is justified belief that one knows that p. In spite
of the divergence among these proposals, all of them hold that the norm of practical
reasoning is belief plus some other property. Let’s call these epistemic norms of prac-
tical reasoning doxastic norms. As in the case of the knowledge norm, these norms can
come in necessity and sufficiency versions depending on whether the relevant doxastic
property is necessary or sufficient for appropriateness.
Against all these views, I doubt that there is an epistemic norm concerning the
appropriateness conditions for treating a proposition as a reason for acting.4 In this
paper, I provide two counterexamples to the knowledge norm. I show cases in which
it is appropriate for a subject to treat p as a reason for action even if the subject does
not know that p. These are cases in which actions are grounded in acceptance and
performed by a skeptic. These cases show that knowledge is not necessary for appro-
priately treating a proposition as a reason for action. Furthermore, I argue that, under
a certain interpretation of epistemic norms, the first case constitutes a counterexam-
ple also to SUFF, according to which knowing that p is epistemically sufficient for
appropriately treating p as a reason for acting. In addition, these cases are also good
counterexamples against the alternative doxastic norms mentioned above including
belief as a requisite, since in both counterexamples the subject does not even hold a
belief about the relevant proposition. My final conclusion is that, even if knowledge, as
well as justified belief, warranted belief, and similar doxastic attitudes, play an impor-
tant role in the rationalization of many our actions, these attitudes are not necessary
for appropriately treating a proposition as a reason for action. Moreover, according
to a specific understanding of epistemic norms, they are even not sufficient. In many
circumstances, different mental attitudes, such as acceptance, provide us with appro-
priate bases for action. Such cases show that there is no epistemic norm governing
practical reasoning.5
Before proceeding further, three clarifications are in order.6 First, the upshot of my
arguments is not that there is no norm at all governing practical reasoning. My argu-
ments are consistent, for example, with the existence of other non-epistemic norms
governing practical reasoning. The aim of my arguments is rather to provide coun-
terexamples to the claim that practical reasoning is governed by an epistemic norm—a
norm whose satisfaction condition is constituted by an epistemic notion such as (jus-
3 Littlejohn has recently abandoned this view and now defends a knowledge norm. See Littlejohn (2013)
for his recent view.
4 Brown (2008a, b) questions the existence of such norms as well.
5 At least if such a norm is conceived as an exceptionless principle valid for every possible premise of
a practical reasoning. This is precisely how philosophers engaged in this debate conceive such a norm.
The arguments in this article are compatible with epistemic norms ranging on some proper subset of such
premises.
6 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for pointing out to me these important
clarifications.
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tified or warranted) belief or knowledge. This is precisely the crux of the debate on
epistemic norms of practical reasoning introduced above.7
Second, my examples aim to show that there are cases in practical reasoning in
which it is appropriate to reason from premises that are not known or believed.
This is compatible with the claim that other premises used in the same reasoning
are known or believed. In all my examples below, the subject is rational in using
premises she doesn’t know or believe in reasoning in which other premises are known.
This is sufficient to show that there are no universally valid epistemic norms like
RKP. 8
The third clarification concerns the specific sense in which these norms for prac-
tical reasoning count as epistemic. According to one obvious understanding, these
norms are epistemic in virtue of the fact that they demand that some epistemic con-
dition with respect to p be satisfied for it to be appropriate to use p as a premise in
practical reasoning. According to another understanding, such norms are epistemic
because they assess whether it is epistemically appropriate to use p as a premise
in practical reasoning—where ‘epistemically’ characterizes the type of appropriate-
ness and differentiates it from other types of appropriateness: prudential, rational,
moral, aesthetic, etc.9 While there is agreement on the fact that such norms are
epistemic in the former sense, there is no consensus on whether they are also epis-
temic in the latter sense. Philosophers such as Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Gerken
(2011) answer affirmatively to this question, whereas others, such as Brown (2008a, b),
remain neutral on this issue, characterizing epistemic norms exclusively in the former
sense. Still others, such as Hawthorne (2004) and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008),
think that epistemic norms of practical reasoning are standards of rational appro-
priateness broadly conceived, not strictly epistemic. While my objections to NEC
will be effective against both understandings of epistemic norms, my objection to
SUFF will be specifically directed to views which do not conceive epistemic norms as
standards of strictly epistemic appropriateness, such as the views of Hawthorne and
Stanley.
7 For example, Gerken specifies that the type of norms relevant to the present debate only speak to the
epistemic conditions under which p may serve as a premise in practical deliberation or as a reason for
action. According to Gerken, authors engaged in this debate are interested in the distinctively epistemic
conditions on rational use of p (Gerken 2011, p. 531 and fn. 3). For similar remarks see, for example
Brown (2012, p. 125). I note also that, though the upshot of my argument is negative, one could even-
tually draw positive conclusions from it about which non-epistemic conditions can rationalize a practical
reasoning.
8 It is worth mentioning here that the specific focus of this paper is on epistemic norms of action. The
paper does not address further issues concerning norms of belief. See Benton (2014, Sect. 3) for an overview
of recent discussions on norms of belief and for relevant references. The aim of the present paper is not
to demote knowledge (or other epistemic attitudes), but rather simply to argue—against (RKP) and other
epistemic norms of action—that believing (and thus knowing) that p is neither necessary, nor sufficient to
reasonably take p as a reason for action.
9 In this sense, epistemic norms would depend on a genuinely epistemic normative source. For a discussion
of different sources of normativity see, for example, Broome (2013, pp. 26–27 and Ch. 7).
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2 Counterexamples to epistemic norms of practical reasoning
2.1 Acceptance and practical reasoning
For a long time philosophers of mind used to explain action within a belief-desire
framework. According to this model, when we act we seek to realize our intentions
and satisfy our desires in the light of what we believe. Similarly, in our practical
reasoning we would reason from desires, beliefs and intentions to action. However,
this philosophical orthodoxy has been called into question: some philosophers have
argued that other attitudes can motivate action and figure as premises in practical
reasoning. A mental attitude often discussed in the literature that plays an important
role in our practical reasoning is acceptance. In what follows, I will illustrate the close
tie between acceptance and practical reasoning and how it poses a serious challenge
to the knowledge norm and other doxastic norms of practical reasoning.
Before discussing the relation between acceptance and practical reasoning, it is
necessary to clarify the notion of acceptance relevant for the present discussion and
how it differs from that of belief. According to some stipulative notions of acceptance,
belief is a kind of acceptance. For example, David Velleman equates accepting that p
with regarding p as true. Since believing necessarily involves regarding a proposition
as true, it is a kind of acceptance. For Velleman, supposing, assuming, and propositional
imagining are other kinds of acceptance (Velleman 2000, pp. 249–250). Similarly, for
Crispin Wright, there is acceptance in all cases where the agent acts in a way as
if she believes that proposition. Also according to this notion, belief is a type of
acceptance. Other attitudes that fall into the category of acceptance include acting on
the assumption that p, taking for granted that p and trusting that p for reasons that do
not bear on considerations regarding the truth of p (Wright 2004, pp. 177–180).
On the contrary, according to a narrower and more natural reading of acceptance
that I use here, acceptance and belief are two different kinds of mental attitude. Many
have argued that acceptance in this narrower sense is an attitude widely adopted in
our ordinary, religious, scientific and technological practices.10 Here is an example
adapted from Michael Bratman (1992, p. 5). I am in Rome on a June day and I am
planning my journey to visit the city. I do not actually have a belief about whether it
will rain or not, nor do I have sufficient reason to believe that it will not rain—e.g., the
weather forecast for that day is not available and according to the records there have
been some showers in June in past years. Nevertheless, in my present circumstances
taking for granted that it will not rain simplifies my planning in a way that is useful.
On the basis of that acceptance I decide to leave the umbrella at my hotel. Below I
will consider other examples of acceptance.
10 For instance, Alston (1996), Audi (2008), Rey (2007), Sperber (1996) and Van Leeuwen (2014) all argue
that religious attitudes are acceptance or acceptance-like rather than belief or belief-like. Cohen (1992),
Maher (1990), Mosterín (2002), and Van Fraassen (1980) have argued that it is reasonable for scientists
to merely accept the content of their scientific theories but not believe them. Bratman (1992) and Cohen
(1989) discuss ordinary examples of acceptance such as the one considered immediately below.
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It has been argued that acceptance differs from belief in at least three respects.11
First, acceptance and belief differ from each other in terms of the requirements of
rationality governing the two attitudes. Reasonable belief is peculiarly responsive to
truth-conducive, epistemic factors; believing a proposition requires regarding it as
true with the aim or commitment of getting its truth-value right.12 On the contrary,
acceptance doesn’t involve commitments to the truth of the accepted proposition.13
There are no rational requirements to accept a proposition only if it is true. Accepting
a proposition only involves treating it as if it were true, regardless of whether it is
true or not.14 This doesn’t mean that acceptances are not the object of rationality
requirements and are not liable to criticisms. Standards for rational acceptance concern
non-epistemic factors, such as instrumental, ethical and prudential considerations.
Acceptances are assessed according to whether it is useful or convenient for the agent to
accept p given her practical purposes, whether accepting p maximizes one’s expected
utility, and so on.15
Second, while belief is context independent or context invariant, acceptance is
context dependent. When we believe something, we regard it as true no matter what
our practical situation. By contrast, what one accepts can vary from context to context
depending on the particular practical demands of the situation. These demands can
sometimes make it reasonable for an agent to accept a proposition in a given context,
11 Philosophers who have defended the distinction between belief and acceptance include Alston (1996),
Audi (2008), Bratman (1992). Buckareff (2004), Dub (2015), Engel (1998), Mosterín (2002), Rey (1988),
Stalnaker (1984), Tuomela (2000), Van Fraassen (1980), Velleman (2000). Other proposals in characterizing
an acceptance-like mental state include de Sousa’s ‘assent’ (1971), Dennett’s ‘opinion’ (1978), Sperber’s
‘reflective belief’ (1996, 1997) and Frankish’s ‘superbelief’ (2004). There are important differences between
these authors in the ways they draw the distinction between belief and acceptance, but the three essential
differences identified here are common to most of them.
12 For a defense of similar claims see for example, Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002, 2013), Shah
(2003), Steglich-Petersen (2006), Engel (2013).
13 We use ‘commitment’ in at least two senses. On the one hand, commitment refers to an attitude of
endorsement; on the other hand, it refers to a norm or a requirement. In what we may call the ‘requirement’
sense, a commitment is a requirement or a norm that an agent is committed to respect. Such a norm would
take the following form: accept that p only if p (or only if there is evidence for p). This type of commitment
is much discussed in the literature on the normativity of belief (cf. McHugh and Whiting 2014). There are
no requirements of this sort on acceptance in the narrow sense relevant here: acceptance doesn’t involve a
commitment to endorse a proposition only if its content is true, as belief does. If acceptance involves some
commitment to the truth, it is in a different sense, which we may call ‘endorsement’: this is an endorsement
or intention that the agent deliberately takes toward a proposition, making as if that proposition were true
for practical purposes.
14 For example, Vahid (2006, pp. 323–324) argues that while belief involves regarding p as true for its
own sake (or for the sake of getting its truth value right), other attitudes involve regarding p as true for the
sake of something else. For example, assuming involves regarding p as true for the sake of argument (i.e.
in order to see what it entails), and imagining involves regarding p as true for motivational purposes. An
analogous claim can be made for acceptance. In the sense used here, acceptance is regarding p as true for
the sake of practical purposes. In a similar vein, Cohen writes that “[t]o accept that p is to adopt the policy
of taking the proposition that p as a premise in appropriate circumstances” (1989, p. 374).
15 For similar characterizations of acceptance, see Bratman (1992) and Cohen (1989). My examples in the
text will focus on a specific practical functional role of acceptance, that of helping us to make our practical
reasoning more economical and faster in some circumstances, allowing us to avoid the use of more complex
believed propositions. I just note here that there can be other practical purposes making rational the use of
acceptances as premises in reasoning. See the quoted references for other examples.
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even though she would not reasonably accept the same proposition in another context.
While in planning my journey for a visit to Rome I reasonably accept that it will not
rain, if I were figuring out what odds I would put in a bet on the weather I would not
rely on that acceptance (Bratman 1992, p. 5). Contextual dependence of acceptance
explains why, while belief is subject to an ideal of agglomeration across contexts—
one should be able to or aim to integrate one’s various beliefs into one consistent and
coherent larger view—one may accept certain things which do not cohere with her
other beliefs, for mere practical reasons present in a specific context.
Third, acceptance and belief differ from each other with respect to voluntary control.
Normally, believing a proposition is an involuntary mental state. It is a disposition I
find myself having, a product of my automatic cognitive mechanism. Furthermore,
one cannot form or revise a belief at will regardless of the evidence (or at least not
in normal circumstances). By contrast, accepting a proposition is, or is generated by,
a mental act involving voluntarily taking on a positive attitude toward a proposition
depending on practical considerations.16
By bearing this in mind, we can find a series of cases in which it is reasonable for
the subject to accept that p under practical pressure, and appropriate to treat p as a
reason for action, in spite of not having good reason to believe it (or even having good
reasons to believe the contrary). All the situations in which it is rational to act on a
proposition that is accepted but not believed constitute counterexamples to NEC and
necessity versions of other doxastic norms.
A variant of Pascal’s Wager provides us with a good example here. Considerations
about how it might be beneficial to live as if God exists cannot ground beliefs about
God’s existence. Nonetheless, they are indeed good practical reasons for accepting that
God exists.17 Suppose one rationally decides to wager for the existence of God purely
on the basis of a calculation of expected utility. This person would thereby accept but
not believe that God exists. She would then take the proposition that God exists as a
premise in her practical reasoning and simply endorse the policies and assent (at least
externally) to the doctrines of the Church. She doesn’t need to make that calculation
over and over again each time this proposition matters to her practical decisions; and
16 Mosterín (2002, pp. 317–319) makes a similar point in terms of the ways of processing information
involved in forming belief and acceptance. He observes that belief is typically tied to unconscious processing
of information whereas acceptance is generated by conscious, explicit, linguistically articulated decision-
driven processing of information. Dub (2015) has argued that delusions constitute pathological cases of
acceptance that are formed involuntarily. If this is correct, acceptances are not always voluntarily formed and
under the control of the will. Nonetheless, the possibility that acceptance can be controlled voluntarily still
constitutes a genuine difference between acceptance and belief. My examples below will refer exclusively
to voluntary cases of acceptance.
17 Notice here an important difference with respect to the original Pascal’s Wager case. Pascal’s God
demands that we believe in him—mere acceptance is not sufficient. According to Pascal, the reason for
going to church is to cause oneself to believe that God exists. In the present example I consider a case in
which S doesn’t take God to ask him to believe in His existence. Instead, S’s acceptance of God is merely
motivated by how practically beneficial it would be to live as if God existed. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for making this difference clear to me. It is also worth mentioning here that a rational agent convinced by
this type of Pascalian-like reasoning should have some minimal degree of credence that God exists. This
is because part of the Pascalian reasoning relies on attributing at least a small chance that God exists. This
subjective chance allows accepting that God exists to maximize expected utility. This wouldn’t be the case
if the agent’s credence that God exists were zero.
123
1908 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917
she doesn’t even need to treat the believed proposition ‘if God exists and I don’t behave
in accordance with God’s doctrines, then I will receive severe punishment after I die’
as a reason for action every time she engages in a relevant practical reasoning. Rather,
in many circumstances she will simply treat the accepted proposition that God exists
as a reason for her action. For example, she may be motivated by this acceptance to
spend more time in the church and follow the precepts of religion.18 Moreover, though
she merely accepts that God exists, it seems that it is not inappropriate or irrational
for her to treat that accepted proposition as a reason in her practical reasoning.
Another common situation in which it is appropriate to act on mere acceptance
comes from scientific practices. There are cases in which the scientists’ actions are
based on some background assumptions that they know to be false. For example,
nobody in the scientific community believes in the validity and completeness of New-
ton’s theory of motion. But because of its convenience for making calculations in
certain contexts, it is warranted for scientists to use Newton’s laws as premises in their
reasoning, acting as if such laws were true, at least as long as the margins of error
permit it. When used in practical reasoning, these laws can provide sufficiently pre-
cise predictions given specific practical purposes. This is compatible with scientists
knowing that Newtonian laws are false.19
The point can be generalized to the majority of natural laws. It is widely accepted in
the scientific community that no contemporary physical theory is actually true. Science
is far from having reached conclusive results. However, in practice scientists accept
the available natural laws, using them as premises in at least some of their reasoning
in order to calculate, design experiments and so on. Accepting natural laws in order to
use them in one’s reasoning is very convenient in specific circumstances: it helps in
achieving reasonably accurate conclusions in a simpler and faster way, even though
the scientist is well aware that these laws are false.20
A specific example could be useful here. A scientist, Mary, must deliberate about
which specific act of computation she should perform in order to calculate the amount
of fuel needed to get to the moon and back in a lunar module. Mary needs to calculate
the amount of fuel quickly. She doesn’t have time to use General Relativity, which
(let’s say) she actually knows to be the true theory. She can calculate the amount of
fuel more quickly by using Newton’s laws, which Mary believes to be false but a
good approximation to the truth for her present purposes. While Mary could well use
as a premise in her reasoning something she knows— e.g., the complex proposition
that [F=ma is the Newton’s law necessary for calculating the needed amount of fuel,
and F=ma, though false, provides a good approximation given her present practical
purposes]— we can well conceive circumstances in which Mary does not use this
complex proposition as a premise in her reasoning, but rather reasons as follows:
(1) I must calculate the vector sum of the force of O.
18 Maybe such actions will cause her to believe that God exists at some future time, but before that time,
most of her actions will be based on acceptance, not belief.
19 Thanks to Jonas Christensen for suggesting this case to me.
20 As a matter of fact, the use of acceptance is quite widespread in many scientific practices. See also
Cohen (1992, p. 88).
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(2) The vector sum of the force of an object is equal to the mass multiplied by its
acceleration.
(3) Therefore I shall multiply the mass of O by the acceleration of O.
The use of (2) in Mary’s reasoning instead of more complex propositions doesn’t
look rationally impermissible. Reasoning directly from the accepted Newton’s law
helps her in achieving the desired results in a faster and simpler way. It seems perfectly
natural and reasonable to reason like this in similar circumstances. Indeed nobody
would challenge reasoning (1)–(3) as inappropriate or rationally impermissible, and if
Mary were asked why she drew conclusion (3), she could well cite in her defense the
accepted proposition (2) instead of other known propositions.21 This example seems
to be a quite realistic representation of how many scientists engaging in practical
reasoning use as premises in their reasoning some accepted proposition that they
believe to be false when the desired results must not be overly precise.22,23
If one were not convinced by Mary’s case, here is another more familiar example
from our philosophical practice. When we calculate the subjective probability of some
propositions by updating evidence using Bayesian conditionalization, we know (or at
least believe) that there are more precise rules for updating evidence (e.g., Jeffrey con-
ditionalization), and thus that the proposition expressing Bayesian conditionalization
is literally false. Nevertheless if we are in contexts in which we are not concerned
with a high level of accuracy (for example, if we are trying to solve basic exercises
21 I am not denying here that the belief that (2) is a good approximation to a desired result plays a
certain indirect role in the overall explanation, motivating and making reasonable for Mary to endorse the
acceptance and use it as a premise in her reasoning. Nevertheless, in the described case Mary doesn’t use the
complex belief as a premise in her reasoning, but the acceptance (i.e. Newton’s law). The knowledge norm
is still compromised, for this norm concerns directly the attitudes that one is rational to use as premises in
reasoning, not the motivations of the subject to endorse certain types of attitude and use them as premises
in reasoning.
22 Two things are worth remarking here: the first is that acceptance of natural laws known to be false
in one’s reasoning is not something specific to scientific practice. Laws are directly used as premises in
reasoning by, for example, engineers and teachers. The second remark is that in Mary’s example I focused
on a case in which it is urgent to make a decision. This should provide a further reason for Mary not to
engage in complex reasoning and instead rely on acceptance. Other factors may influence the preference
for acceptance over more complex beliefs. Another is, for example, the presence of multiple consecutive
deliberations involving common premises—consider a variant of Mary’s case in which she has to repeat the
calculation several times; in such case it is simpler to rely on the accepted Newton’s law than to repeatedly
rely on complex beliefs and more elaborated inferential patterns.
23 An anonymous referee considers the possibility of a pragmatic explanation of the case: while in con-
versation Mary can express her reasoning as in (1)–(3), that may just be shorthand for a more complex
reasoning understood in the conversational context, involving only beliefs as premises. Notice however that
as I described the case, there is no conversational context in which Mary talks about her inference. Rather,
the case involves a genuine inferential transition from premises (1) and (2) to conclusion (3). This excludes
the possibility of explaining the case in terms of conversational implicatures. Another reason to think that a
pragmatic account of Mary’s reasoning is implausible is the following. To someone who criticizes Mary for
relying on a false premise it seems to make perfect sense to answer by saying that, of course, Newton’s law
is false, but making as if it were true and relying on it in her reasoning makes things simpler and reaches a
conclusion whose accuracy is sufficient for present practical purposes. This possible answer seems perfectly
fine in this context, but it is incompatible with a pragmatic account, according to which the only correct
answer to the challenge should be the resolution of a conversational implicature (for example: “of course,
I was not speaking literally. What I really meant was…”). The fact that the former answer seems perfectly
appropriate shows that a pragmatic account about this and similar cases is inadequate.
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in a Decision Theory course), we make as if the proposition expressing Bayesian
conditionalization were true. When we reason from this proposition in such contexts,
we deliberately overlook the fact that it is inaccurate and we move automatically to a
conclusion, as we would do in reasoning from a belief. This way of reasoning from
accepted propositions that we believe to be false (or at least we would hardly say
we believe) in our philosophical practice seems to me both common and perfectly
rational.
In both the exemplified cases of the Pascalian wager and the scientific practice, it
seems perfectly rational for an agent to treat a proposition that is accepted but not
believed as a reason for action. These cases constitute counterexamples to NEC and
necessity versions of other doxastic norms.
From the case of scientific practice, we can also develop a counterexample to certain
versions of SUFF. As I said in Sect. 1, while some philosophers interpret epistemic
norms as concerning a specifically epistemic sense of appropriateness, others conceive
appropriateness in a more liberal sense (for example as substantive rational permissi-
bility). The example I will consider below is problematic for all those endorsing the
latter interpretation of SUFF (e.g. Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). A counterexample
to this version of SUFF is one in which S knows that p, but given the setting of S’s
situation, it is not rationally permissible for S to treat p as a reason for acting. Con-
sider again the above scenario in which Mary knows the true and complex physical
law of General Relativity necessary to calculate the precise amount of fuel needed
for a lunar module to get to the moon and back. We can imagine a similar situation
in which it is not rationally permissible for her to take that known proposition as a
premise in her reasoning. Suppose again that Mary needs to calculate the amount of
fuel only to a rough approximation, but it is particularly urgent that she does that in a
very short time (e.g., she has only twenty seconds to enter an estimation of the amount
of fuel into the control system of a machine).24 In such a situation, since adopting
Newtonian laws would perfectly suffice for the purpose, it would be unreasonable
for her to use the complex law in her calculations. This is incompatible with SUFF.
Note that Mary’s epistemic position with respect to the proposition expressing the
true physical law is also strong enough to satisfy the constraints required by other
epistemic norms (justified belief that p, warranted belief that p to a degree that is
adequate relative to deliberative context, or justified belief that S knows that p). And
in the described situation it is inappropriate for her to use that proposition as a premise
in her practical reasoning no matter how strong her epistemic position is with respect
to that proposition. Therefore, all the sufficiency versions of other epistemic norms,
if interpreted in the liberal sense considered above, are confronted with a problem in
dealing with this type of case as well.25
24 Parameters including urgency that constitute deliberative contexts are discussed in Gerken (2011). One
might worry here that though the agent in those cases seems to be blameless and fully excusable, he/she
does violate some epistemic norm. I will address this possible worry in Sect. 2.3.
25 Similar cases against SUFF can be made involving other attitudes. For example, suppose that
Karen knows the axioms of number theory, and that Meera, who is reliable with mathematical knowledge,
said that p is a theorem (although it is false). It becomes an urgent question for Karen whether p is a theorem.
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A possible worry here could be that since acceptance doesn’t involve rational com-
mitments to the truth of the accepted proposition, acceptances are not liable to rational
criticism and thus cannot serve as rationalizers of an action or a deliberation when used
as premises in practical reasoning.26 However, I think that this worry is misplaced. As
I said above, acceptances can be rationally assessed and criticized according to prac-
tical standards, and agents using acceptances as premises in practical reasoning are
liable to rational criticism according to these standards. For example, if one concludes
that accepting that God exists has the best expected utility, but then accepts that God
doesn’t exist and uses this acceptance as a premise in her reasoning, her acceptance can
be assessed as unwarranted, and premising this proposition in her reasoning is liable
to criticism. Similarly, consider the case of an engineer who accepts some law of
Newton’s theory in a context in which this theory doesn’t provide sufficiently precise
predictions for her specific practical purposes (e.g., for designing a particle collider
machine), and she applies such laws as premises in her reasoning in that context (e.g.,
for making calculations whose results are necessary to design hadron accelerators).
The reasoning of this engineer is liable to criticism and her acceptance cannot ratio-
nalize her action. This is because that acceptance is unreasonable given the practical
purposes of the engineer in that context.
2.2 Rational action performed by the skeptic
Consider the following dialogue in which a skeptic (K ) is trying to convince her friend
(F) that she doesn’t know that there is an external world.
K : “Do you know that you are not a brain in a vat?”
F : “No, I don’t know.”
K : “If you are a brain in a vat, then you cannot hold this cup of coffee in your
hand, because you don’t have hands at all. So, since you don’t know that you are
not a brain in a vat, you don’t know that you have a cup of coffee in your hand.”
After brief thought, F concludes: “Yes, you are right, I don’t know that.” Thus she
suspends her judgment. At the same time, F moves her cup to her lips and drinks
the coffee.
I assume that: (1) F takes the conversation seriously and answers K sincerely, i.e.,
F does not give that answer to K due to any non-epistemic considerations, such as
social graces and reluctance to displease her friend; rather, F is truly convinced by
K ’s reasoning and suspends her judgment as a consequence of that reasoning; (2) in
moving the cup F genuinely exercises her agency; (3) the proposition that there is a
cup of coffee in F’s hand (hereafter, H) is one of the reasons motivating her action; (4)
The proposition that F treats as a reason for lifting her hand is H, not some complex
proposition such as that, whether or not she is a BIV, seemingly lifting her hand will
cause a pleasant taste and sensation of warmth.
Footnote 25 continued
It is unreasonable for her to start reasoning from the axioms—she should instead rely on Meera’s testimony.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
26 Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for directing my attention to this worry.
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Now, intuitively, it seems that F’s action cannot be criticized as irrational.27 Accord-
ing to NEC, if it is appropriate for F to treat H as a reason for acting, then F knows
H. But F voluntarily suspended her belief that H. F doesn’t believe H anymore, and
consequently does not know that H. This is a counterexample to NEC.
It might be argued that in the above example there are other beliefs (plausi-
bly amounting to knowledge) which F may be using as premises in her practical
reasoning—in particular the belief that there might be a cup of coffee in front of
F . Given the low cost of the action, this belief seems sufficient to rationalize it.28
This objection can be addressed by considering other analogous cases in which the
skeptic doesn’t merely suspend her judgment on the relevant proposition but believes
that proposition to be false. Consider domain-relative forms of skepticism, such as
skepticism about the existence of objects in the domains of mathematics, modality,
ethics, etc. Such forms of skepticism are compatible with fictionalism with respect to
each of these domains. For example, a fictionalist skeptic about mathematics holds
that we should not believe in the existence of mathematical objects and we should
regard sentences about mathematical objects, not as aiming at literal truth, but as
telling part of a fictional story. For this skeptic, even if mathematical sentences are
all false, engaging in a discourse about mathematics is rational because of its utility
(Leng 2015). Similarly, the fictionalist can rationally act as if those sentences were
true. Lacking beliefs about mathematical propositions doesn’t make the use of these
propositions as premises in one’s reasoning irrational or unreasonable. A fictionalist
mathematician can perfectly well use sentences such as ‘7 + 5 = 12’ or ‘There are
no square prime numbers’ as premises in her reasoning (both theoretical and practi-
cal); she can continue doing mathematics by adopting non-doxastic attitudes towards
ordinary mathematical propositions.29 In such cases, a skeptic about a certain area
of discourse overtly believes that a proposition is false (and thus that it might not be
true), but relies on it in her reasoning as if it were true. One can see the skeptic about
the external world in my previous example as relying on an analogous sort of attitude
in her practical reasoning.
One may object that F still involuntarily believes that H even though she would
not be voluntarily willing to assent to it (Pritchard 2000, p. 203). If this were the case,
according to some externalist account of knowledge, F would know that H as long as
some external condition is satisfied—for instance, if F’s belief that H were reliably
formed. Furthermore, Williamson (2000) convincingly argues that knowledge is not
a luminous mental state: one is not always in a position to reflectively know that she
27 Here I don’t want to argue that before this conversation F didn’t know that there was a cup of coffee in
her hand. In fact F may have known that proposition before the conversation, but may have suspended her
belief in that proposition as a consequence of the considerations proposed by K .
28 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
29 It has been widely argued that people who refuse to accept the truths of mathematics can still continue
doing mathematics by having an attitude towards mathematical objects sometimes referred as make-believe
(also acceptance or exploitation) (see e.g. Van Fraassen 1980; Yablo 2006; Daly 2008).
123
Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1913
knows something. In the light of the above observations, one could say that what F
lacks in the scenario is the higher-order knowledge that she knows that p, but not the
first-order knowledge that p.
A possible way to defend the step from F’s claimed suspension of judgment about H
to F’s ignorance of that proposition is by assuming that, even if in general knowledge
may not be transparent to a subject, there are possible situations in which a subject in a
case like that of F has an appropriate access to her own epistemic states. The possible
failure of transparency in some cases does not entail that one is always wrong about
her first-order mental states. In particular, it is possible to conceive a scenario like the
one described above such that, when F sincerely asserts that she doesn’t know that H,
she has a full epistemic access to the fact that she withholds her belief that H. In such
a possible case, F would thereby not know that H. Even one single possible case like
this is sufficient to provide a counterexample to NEC.30
A more powerful objection is the following. There are possible ways of interpreting
what’s going on in F’s psychology in the above case, some of which is incompatible
with the case being a counterexample to NEC. For example, Egan (2008) has recently
argued for the view that the systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented and
could include subsets of beliefs which are possibly inconsistent. This view is opposed
to idealized models of human cognition according to which our beliefs would be part
of a single coherent system. In the above case, one can interpret F’s cognitive system
as fragmented, her skepticism not affecting her belief that H. If so, F can rely on the
belief that H in her action. So described, the case wouldn’t constitute a counterexample
to NEC.31
I concede that it’s a much debated question in philosophy of psychology how to
interpret similar cases, and that a “fragmented mind” hypothesis seems a possible way
of interpreting what’s going on in F’s psychology in the above example. I admit that
there are several possible interpretations of the case, some of which incompatible with
the case being a counterexample to NEC. But remember here that in order to make
my point, all that I need is that there be at least one psychologically possible descrip-
tion of the example (or similar examples) under which F doesn’t believe that H. The
possibility of a single case in which F doesn’t believe that H would be already a coun-
terexample to NEC. This is perfectly compatible with there being other descriptions
of this and similar cases according to which the subject believes the relevant propo-
sition (as in the “fragmented mind” interpretation). However, in the present context I
cannot settle the issue of whether a description of the case that suits my purposes is
psychologically possible. For this reason, I will set this issue aside and for the sake
of argument I will simply assume that a similar description is indeed possible. My
conclusion about the present case will thus be merely conditional: assuming an inter-
30 Neta (2009) argues that it is possible to know that p even if one believes that one does not know thatp.
But Neta’s point doesn’t conflict with what is suggested here.
31 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to address this objection.
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pretation of this (or some similar) case as one in which the subject doesn’t believe the
target proposition, the case constitutes a counterexample to NEC.32
2.3 A reply to a possible objection
One could defend the knowledge norm by arguing that though the agent in those
cases seems to be blameless, he/she does violate the knowledge norm. Hawthorne and
Stanley consider a situation in which someone in a situation of urgency is intuitively
blameless in acting on mere partial belief. They claim that this kind of case doesn’t
ultimately threaten the knowledge norm; according to them, “the fact that we do not
blame someone forced into a quick decision is no evidence at all against it” (Hawthorne
and Stanley 2008, p. 587). In their view, the agent is blameless because the practical
circumstances excuse her for violating the knowledge norm. Similarly, Hawthorne and
Stanley could object to the above counterexamples by saying that the agent violates
the norm but is excusable, for in these situations practical considerations render it
excusable to act on less than knowledge.
Here are two replies. First, in the exemplified cases it is hard to see in what sense
the agent needs to be excused. Our intuition suggests that the agent does not violate
any epistemic constraint on practical rationality. For instance, when scientists have
good reasons to use an out-of-date Newtonian law as a premise in their calculation,
we neither judge them as acting inappropriately in any sense nor do we feel them
in need of excuse for some wrongdoing. In these cases, there is no indication of the
violation of some normative standard, either practical or epistemic: no criticizability,
no blameability or excusability according to any normative assessment whatsoever.
Second, the maneuver of appealing to excuses is rather unpromising. Gerken (2011)
points out that unless upholders of the knowledge norm can specify the notions of
excuse and/or blamelessness, an appeal to excuses would be ad hoc and thus uncon-
vincing. He then critically considers several possible principled accounts of excuse,
and argues that none of them is free from serious problems. It seems even more implau-
sible to work out a viable account of excuse able to accommodate the types of cases
32 What could be the mental attitude that F has towards H if it is not belief? There are two possible
interpretations here. One is acceptance: F decides to adopt the working hypothesis that she is not mas-
sively deceived in order to simplify her thinking, and uses this hypothesis as a premise in her reasoning.
Alternatively, we can conceive the example as one in which F relies on H in an unreflective way, without
first explicitly performing an act of acceptance. In this case, interpreting the attitude as acceptance would
probably not be very accurate. A wide literature on Pyrrhonism suggests that the relevant attitude in such
a case would be appearance. Sextus Empiricus (1994) describes an appearance as an involuntary affection
(pathos) of the skeptic, something she passively undergoes. Unlike belief, an appearance makes no claims
regarding the truth-value of p. Appearances, unlike beliefs, do not aim at truth, in the sense that they are
not attitudes directed at correctly representing real states of affairs. Accordingly, they cannot be questioned
and criticized with regard to their truth-dimension. Rather, they are appropriately assessed with regard to
promoting a life free from turmoil and favoring the achievement of imperturbability. While beliefs involve
a commitment to the truth of what is believed, appearances are attitudes supposed to represent with the
practical aim of acquiring peace of mind.
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considered above, not to mention that each of them involves completely different sorts
of circumstances.33
3 Conclusion
What conditions make it appropriate to treat p as a reason for action? In this paper,
I argued that neither knowing that p nor believing that p are necessary or sufficient
conditions for appropriately treating p as a reason for action. Notice however that
the aim of this paper was not to criticize RKP and other doxastic norms of practical
reasoning on the ground that knowledge or warranted belief don’t play any role for
the rationalization of actions. Rather, it was to point out the limits of these principles
by showing how rational actions may be based in some cases on other mental attitude
such as acceptance.
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